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Abstract 
This paper investigated the changes in competitive behaviour of banks in sub-Saharan Africa, 
following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Using 481 bank-year observations from an 
unbalanced panel of 83 banks from six countries over the period 2008–2013. We employed the 
Panzar-Rosse model of firm competition, and found that the degree of competition among banks in 
Sub-Saharan Africa increased. This increase is due to the effect of reform/liberalisation policies, 
largely initiated in the pre-crisis era. The success that followed via the development of banking 
systems, nonetheless moderated at the onset of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. System instabilities, 
which were characteristic of a post-crisis period, exposed deficiencies in regulation and asymmetric 
incentives for bank management. A significant recalibration of prudential policies followed, as 
regulators sought to restore system stability, which again had an impact in altering competitive 
conduct of banks. Policymakers should continue to develop and promote policies geared towards the 
development of financial intermediation and improved competitive conduct of banks in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
Keywords: Bank competition, competitive behaviour, Panzar-Rosse model, H-Statistics, E-Statistics, 
sub-Sahara Africa. 
JEL Classifications:  D41, D42, D43, E32, E44, F36 
1. Introduction
In the light of 2007/2008 financial crisis, this study investigated bank competition using the 
Panzar-Rosse model, a non-structural approach that determines the pricing behaviour of 
firms. The analysis contained sample banks in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2008 and 2013, a 
period in which substantial macroeconomic challenges and increased systemic risk 
materialised (Brambila-Macias & Massa, 2009; Arieff, 2010; Allen, Otchere & Senbet, 2011) 
because of the financial crisis. However, in the pre-crisis era, significant economic reforms 
and financial liberalisation policies (Bikker, Spierdijk & Finnie, 2007; Claessens, Laeven, 
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Igan & Dell'Ariccia, 2010; Sanya & Gaertner, 2012; Fosu, 2013), were implemented, setting 
the tone for increased competition among banks in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Increasing competitiveness among banks matters1 for a number of reasons. First, it promotes 
effective financial intermediation, and explains the structure, stability, efficiency and 
performance of the industry (Casu & Girardone, 2006; Fosu, 2013; Schaeck & Čihák, 2014). 
Second, it lowers interest rates and improves the production, quality and distribution of 
banking products. Third, it explains the level of access to financial services and extent of 
external financing at household and firm level (Rajan & Zingales, 1996; Allen & Gale, 2004; 
Claessens & Laeven, 2005; Bikker et al, 2007; Simbanegavi, Greenberg & Gwatidzo, 2012). 
Finally, it improves effectiveness of monetary policy transmission, supports real economy 
production efficiency and promotes overall growth and development (Claessens & Laeven, 
2003, 2005; Kot, 2004; Casu & Girardone, 2006; Bikker et al., 2007; Claessens et al., 2010; 
Fosu, 2013). 
The primary motivation for this study stemmed from the sheer diversity of economies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and their influence on competitiveness in banking systems. With an 
estimated total GDP of approximately USD 1.60 trillion in 2013, and estimated 650 banks on 
the sub-content (as obtained from each country’s central bank). Historically linked to World 
Bank and IMF2 reform that commenced in the early 1980s (Senbet & Otchere, 2006), the 
structure and size of economies and their banking systems reflect the extent of deregulation 
of markets and trade, promotion of private enterprise and innovation, as well as ease of entry 
of foreign participants. The Nigerian and South African economies, for example, comprise 
approximately 50 percent of total sub-continental GDP (WDI, 2013), and have large and 
diversified banking systems that are competitive and active compare to most countries in the 
region. Medium-sized economies such as Angola, Kenya and Ghana also have competitive 
banking systems with significant foreign participants, while smaller island economies such as 
Mauritius and The Seychelles have, by comparison, first-class leading banks and 
sophisticated financial products and services. As such, the diversity, size and sophistication 
of economies and banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa triggered an investigation into 
competitiveness and performance of banks.    
The second motivating factor was a desire to investigate how the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
triggered poor performance of banks (Fosu, 2013). In turn, poor performance led to increased 
systemic risk to the financial architecture and the exposure of structural weakness in 
supervision and prudential policies (Dahou, Omar & Pfister, 2009; Allen & Giovannetti, 
2011; Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Pería & Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2012). Following from the 
concept of information asymmetry (Mishkin, 2013), in which banks faced problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in their lending activity, the risk to small depositors, for 
instance, increased in the wake of financial crises (Stiglitz, 1994; Mishkin, 2013). This risk 
materialised in the form of sequential service constraints (Andolfatto & Nosal, 2008), which 
created an incentive for depositors to seek verification of the solvency of banks (Diamond & 
1 Notwithstanding the benefits of competition, aggressive conduct by banks or excessive risk-taking can have 
several negative implications, such as: (1) creation of asset-price bubbles, (2) artificial credit growth and 
proliferation of opaque financial products, (3) deterioration of asset quality, (4) excess leverage and build-up of 
systemic risk to the financial architecture, and (5) triggering de-marketing campaigns (Boot & Thakor, 1997; 
Claessens, Laeven, Igan & Dell'Ariccia, 2010; Sanusi, 2012).  
2 A blueprint of economic structural adjustment programmes.  
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Dybvig, 1983). In the interests of depositors, global recalibration of prudential policies 
followed with enactment of the Volcker Rule3 (Whitehead, 2011; Thakor, 2012).  
Lastly, a motivating factor for this study was that the existing literature on bank competition 
in developing countries remains crucially limited, thus presenting an opportunity to provide 
additional insights. Moreover, a significant limitation of the literature is that it largely covers 
single country analyses (Buchs & Mathisen, 2005; Hauner & Peiris, 2005; Greenberg & 
Simbanegavi, 2009; Biekpe, 2011; Simpasa, 2011; Simbanegavi et al., 2012, Osuagwu & 
Nwokoma, 2017), as opposed to cross-country evidence, which remains limited (Sanya & 
Gaertner, 2012; Fosu, 2013). This limitation results in an omission of the effect of regional 
integration, trade, interdependence of intermediation and harmonisation of regulation and 
monetary policy (Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Bikker, Shaffer & Spierdijk, 2009; Sanya & 
Gaertner, 2012; Fosu, 2013). However, authors have often indicated that insufficient data 
availability is a critical reason for the scant literature (Claessens & Laeven, 2003, 2005; 
Sanya & Gaertner, 2012; Fosu, 2013).   
The objectives of this study were in two parts as follows: 
i. Measuring banking competition
The first objective was to examine changes in banking competition in Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
a period of significant banking and economic reform that also coincided with the onset of the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, the study sought to examine, from a non-
structural view, pricing behaviour of banks by applying the Panzar-Rosse model to compute a 
continuous measure of a static H-statistic. The computed value would therefore suggest the 
extent of contestability of markets. Further, the research assignment sought to validate the H-
statistic by computing an E-statistic, which explains a state of general market equilibrium as a 
pre-condition to measuring banking competition. 
ii. Adding insights to existing literature
Apart from empirical testing, another objective of this study is to contribute new insights to 
the current debate on competition and its impact on financial sector development strategy 
(Claessens & Laeven, 2003). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, prior studies on banking 
competition remain limited (Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Buchs & Mathisen, 2005; Hauner & 
Peiris, 2005; Bikker et al., 2009; Greenberg & Simbanegavi, 2009; Schaeck, Čihák & Wolfe, 
2009; Simpasa, 2011; Sanya & Gaertner, 2012; Simbanegavi et al., 2012; Fosu, 2013, and 
Osuagwu and Nwokoma 2017), by comparison with developed economies. Moreover, 
reviewed studies do not adequately capture the post 2007/2008 financial crisis in which 
significant implementation of reform/liberalisation and prudential policies influenced 
competitive behaviour.    
2.1 Literature Review 
This section provides a theoretical background to the various pricing strategies of firms that 
influence competitive behaviour. A review of relevant empirical literature, was also 
undertaken.  
3 Volcker Rule was enacted in 2010 to counter the negative effects universal banking introduced by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.   
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2.2.1 Structural approach to measuring competition 
The structural approach assumes a causal relationship between market structure and 
performance (Bikker & Haaf, 2002) and consists of two competing hypotheses—Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm and Efficient Structure Hypothesis. The SCP 
paradigm, according to Bain and Qualls (1968: 381), posits that high concentration in an 
industry weakens the degree of competition and encourages collusive behaviour by 
organisations. In turn, collusive behaviour leads to abnormal profit at the expense of 
efficiency. Popular empirical tests that support the SCP paradigm are the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and firm concentration ratio (CRn).  
The Efficient Structure Hypothesis (ESH), originally proposed by Demsetz (1973), indicates 
that a larger market share for an individual bank that leads to high industry concentration is 
the result of efficiency and lower input costs, as opposed to a low degree of competition. The 
hypothesis further argues that the SCP paradigm ignores barriers to entry and exit in an 
industry such as economic, legal and technological barriers. In addition, it argues that the 
SCP paradigm does not account for firm efficiency, such as superior staff, technology and 
production efficiency. Therefore, an efficient bank will, over time, increase market share, 
market power and ultimately drive superior performance relative to competitors.   
2.2.2 Non-structural approach to measuring competition 
The non-structural approach, on the other hand, is a modern view, in the manner of the New 
Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) theories. The approach suggests that changes in 
input costs influence pricing behaviour and ultimately performance of banks. This ultimately 
leads to prices being set equal to marginal costs (Iwata, 1974; Bresnahan, 1982; Panzar & 
Rosse, 1987; Bikker & Haaf, 2002). In addition, the non-structural approach argues against 
the notion of a causal relationship between market structure and performance. Popular 
empirical tests are the Panzar-Rosse model (1982, 1987) and Bresnahan model (1982). 
2.2.2.1 The Panzar-Rosse Model 
The Panzar-Rosse model, primarily assumes that the conduct of competing banks influences 
performance of any individual bank. The idea is that banks employ dissimilar pricing 
strategies as they respond to changes in factor input prices; and competitiveness therefore is 
the extent to which changes in input prices reflect in revenues in a state of equilibrium 
(Panzar-Rosse, 1987; Bikker & Haaf, 2002). Assumptions of the model include a single 
product output and profit maximisation, where marginal revenue is set equal to marginal cost. 
Using data at firm level, the test derives a measure called an H-statistic, which is a 
summation of the elasticities of revenue with respect to changes in input prices. In other 
words, an H-statistic is a continuous measure of the level of competition (Bikker & Haaf, 
2002).  
At one end of the measurement, an H-statistic is less than or equal to zero, which implies 
monopoly or oligopoly pricing behaviour. At the other end, it is equal to unity, which implies 
perfect competition. Results for an H-statistic which lie between zero and unity imply varying 
degrees of monopolistic pricing behaviour. Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that for a profit-
maximising monopolist, an H-statistic cannot be positive, since an increase in input raises 
marginal cost. This they say lead to an output restriction and therefore lower revenues. For 
perfect competition where an H-statistic is equal to unity, individual firms incur an increase 
in marginal and average costs without altering equilibrium output.    
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Therefore, deriving an H-statistic follows: 
 (3.1) 
where 'iR  and 
'
iC  are marginal revenue and marginal cost of bank i. Output is xi. The number 
of banks is n.  A vector of input prices is wi. Vectors of exogenous variables that shift the 
revenue and cost functions are zi and ti. Long-run equilibrium imposes a zero-profit constraint 
at market level. 
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In forming comparative static properties of a reduced-form revenue equation, the Panzar-
Rosse model initially utilised cross-sectional data, although in later studies panel data 
estimations became prevalent as cross-country evidence emerged. Despite popularity among 
authors, criticism levelled against the Panzar-Rosse model suggests overestimation of results 
in static equilibrium form, due to the use of price equations, as opposed to unscaled revenue 
(Bikker et al., 2009). Employing a gradual or dynamic approach to equilibrium therefore 
tackles this limitation and provides a model robustness check (Goddard & Wilson, 2009).  
2.2.2.2 The Bresnahan Model 
The Bresnahan model was not applied in this study, but primarily differs from the Panzar-
Rosse model in that it assumes a two-product bank, for example loans and deposits; whereas 
the Panzar-Rosse approach considers one. Other assumptions, nonetheless, are consistent 
with the Panzar-Rosse model, such as general market equilibrium condition and profit 
maximisation. Notably, banks set price P and quantity Q, such that marginal cost MC is equal 
to ‘perceived’ marginal revenue MRP. In a competitive market, MRP = P and in a monopoly, 
MRP = MR. Where there is monopolistic competition, MRP < P. Importantly, bank 
customers are considered price takers, where P = MC. Therefore, the model estimates a 
parameter that ranges from perfect competition to monopoly power. Further, the model 
typically applies aggregate data as opposed to firm-level data.  
2.3 Studies on Sub-Saharan Africa 
In sub-Saharan Africa, a few country-specific studies (Buchs & Mathisen, 2005; Hauner & 
Peiris, 2005; Greenberg & Simbanegavi, 2009; Biekpe, 2011; Simpasa, 2011; Simbanegavi et 
al., 2012, Osuagwu and Nwokoma, 2017), in varying periods between 1998 and 2014, were 
conducted in Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria. The various empirical 
studies tested for changes in competitive conduct by applying the Panzar-Rosse model, and 
all of them determined monopolistic competition. Tests for general market equilibrium 
validated the outcomes. Importantly, the studies highlighted the impact of 
reform/liberalisation and prudential policies on the conduct of banks following periods of 
financial repression.  
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Sanya and Gaertner (2012) examined the determinants of competition in the East African 
region by conducting an empirical test using the Panzar-Rosse model in a sample of four out 
of the five East African Community (EAC) members in the years 2001-2008. Their measured 
H-statistic indicated monopolistic competition, but they found Kenyan banks to be the most 
competitive and Rwandan banks the least.  
Findings from their empirical test suggested that low levels of intermediation, a lack of 
access to financial services and inefficiencies in banking systems in East Africa were 
associated with limited competition. However, reform/liberalisation and prudential policies 
introduced in the early 2000s contributed to a rapid increase in credit to the private sector. 
Policy implementation included restructuring and privatisation of state-owned banks, write-
off of non-performing loans, fostering good governance, easing of barriers to entry and 
tightening of supervision. Importantly, the entry of foreign banks into the region was 
significant, and helped to improve bank sophistication, but state-owned banks retained a very 
large market share.  
Lastly, Fosu (2013) completed a first-ever attempt at broadly assessing bank competition in 
all the sub-regions of Africa. The study employed the Panzar-Rosse model in a sample of 38 
African countries in the period 2002-2009. A test for general market equilibrium validated 
the results. Overall, the study measured the prevalence of monopolistic competition in Africa, 
linked to the implementation of reform/liberalisation and prudential policies undertaken to 
undo critical underperformance of banking systems.  
Fosu (2013) described a continent in which banking systems had been previously plagued by 
controls on interest rates and credit allocation, poor asset quality, as well as dominance by 
state-run banks. However, deregulation had resulted in an increase in regional integration, 
recapitalisation, entry of foreign banks, cross-border competition, advances in technology, 
restructuring and privatisation of state-run banks, and write-off of non-performing loans. This 
resulted in an improvement in the allocative efficiency of credit to the private sector. 
Importantly, Fosu (2013) highlighted that generating interest income was an influencing 
factor in competitive conduct, since most banks in Africa relied on lending activity as a key 
source of revenue. This study build on Fosu (2013) to look at a period that sufficiently 
encapsulated the effect of changes to the bank operating environment in sub-Saharan Africa 
since the onset of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. 
2.4 Development of hypotheses 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) clearly indicated that the competitive structure of a banking system 
could change over time due to the process of reform/liberalisation and deregulation. From 
that view, a calculated H-statistic explains pricing behaviour of firms. By measuring the sum 
of elasticities of revenue to factor input prices, an H-statistic equates to unity where there is 
perfect competition/contestability, implying that an increase in factor prices would not alter 
bank output. A calculated result, which is less than unity but above zero, would suggest an 
alternative view of monopolistic competition or partial contestability, which implies that 
changes in factor input prices affect bank pricing of output. Therefore, the hypothesis 
follows: 
H1. There is a statistically significant positive association between unit factor input prices 
(market power) for a bank and the extent of competitive behaviour. 
Following from the empirical theory on banking competition, in the manner of the NEIO 
framework (Iwata, 1974; Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982; Panzar & Rosse, 1987; Roeger, 1995), 
the validity of the competition parameter is sufficient only when the banking system is 
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observed in general market equilibrium (Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Brooks, 2013: 495). As such, 
an E-statistic, calculated to explain that general market equilibrium exists where the factor 
input prices of funds, labour and capital expenditure do not influence banking returns, is 
statistically equivalent to zero. The hypothesis therefore follows that: 
H2. Market equilibrium exists where returns on bank assets are not associated with factor 
input prices.    
3.1 Research Methodology 
This study applied the Panzar-Rosse approach to measuring banking competition in sub-
Saharan Africa, in light of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. 
3.2 The Population and Sample 
This study drew a sample of banks from a selection of six countries, which represented three 
sub-regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely East Africa (Kenya and Uganda), Southern 
African (Mauritius and South Africa) and West Africa (Ghana and Nigeria). Specifically, the 
selection criteria for the sample anchored on data availability, economic and financial 
development, advanced legal frameworks, good corporate governance and disclosure, and use 
of IFRS reporting standards. From the selected countries, 83 banks (cross-sections) were 
included in the sample out of a possible 152 (see Table 1), which was most representative of 
banks in Sub-Saharan Africa.    
Table 1: Banks population and sample 
Country Population Sample Representation  
Ghana 27 16 59 
Kenya 42 23 55 
Mauritius 21 10 48 
Nigeria 21 14 67 
South Africa 16 11 69 
Uganda 25 9 36 
Total 152 83 55 
Notes: Representation refers to sample as a percentage of population.  
Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
Excluded from the sample were banks with missing data in at least three of the time series 
periods. This was mainly because data for several banks was not available from data sources. 
The selected years (2008-2013) represented a period that sufficiently encapsulated the effect 
of changes to the operating environment in sub-Saharan Africa since the onset of the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis. As a result, the data panel was unbalanced. Consequently, 
possible observations were 498, but 481 were included in the empirical estimation.  
3.3 Data Sources and Collection 
Banks data were mainly sourced from a public database called African Financials. A 
significant number of annual financial statements for banks in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
contained on the platform. For a few other banks, the financial statements pages of bank-
specific websites were used. We utilised only parent or in-country bank financial statements, 
as opposed to consolidated accounts. This satisfied a common-effect specification and 
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reduced bias from multi-country representation (Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Sanya & Gaertner, 
2012). Countries with significant multi-country bias were Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa 
(Claessens & Van Horen, 2011; Sanya & Gaertner, 2012). Data on macroeconomic variables 
were sourced from the World Bank.  
3.4 Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
Table 2 below defines the variables used in the analysis. 
Table 2: Summary of definitions and operationalisation of variables (All in natural log) 
Dependent variables – revenue and general market equilibrium functions  
REV Ratio of interest income to total assets. It represents a scaled revenue function, which is 
explained by changes in unit input prices. 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets. It is regressed to validate the Panzar-Rosse model in general 
market equilibrium. 
 
Independent variables – unit factor input prices that influenced the output pricing behaviour of banks 
PF Unit price of funds or average cost of funds is the ratio of interest expense to total customer 
deposits. 
PL Unit price of labour is the ratio of staff expenses to total assets. 
PK Unit price of capital is the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets. It represents the 
level of capital expenditure. 
 
Bank-specific control variables – controlled for differences in business mix, activity and scale 
RISKASS Ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. It represents the level of conservatism of 
management in lending activity.  
ASSET USD value of balance sheet. It controls for scale. 
CREDIT Ratio of total loans to total assets. This is a representation of lending activity, which is a key 
source of income for banks. 
EQUITY Ratio of shareholder equity to total assets. It controls for leverage. 
 
Country-specific variables – macroeconomic controls which were time variant but fixed per country 
GROWTH Annual GDP growth rate. It captures changes in national income, which is related to 
performance of banks. 
INFL Annual rate of inflation controls for the effect of changes in prices. 
Source: Authors compilation. 
3.4.1 Specifying the Panzar-Rosse equation for H1 
In a sense, the Panzar-Rosse model was a contestability regression (Brooks, 2013: 495), 
which tested whether a change in input prices influenced the output of banks or not. Under 
such influence, the observation indicated a state of monopolistic competition. Without 
influence, the observation indicated perfect competition. Therefore, assuming the 
hypothesised relations were linear, the main fixed-effects regression estimated in this study 
are: 
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lnREVit= α+ β1lnPFit+ β2lnPLit+ β3lnPKit+ γ1lnRISKASSit+γ2lnASSETit+ γ3lnCREDITit+  
γ4lnEQUITYit+ δ1lnGROWTHt+ δ2lnINFLt+ φD2+ φD3 +⋯+φD6+ϑit , (i) 
Alternatively, 
lnREVit= α+ β1lnPFit+ β2lnPLit+ β3lnPKit+ γ1lnRISKASSit+γ2lnASSETit+ γ3lnCREDITit+  
γ4lnEQUITYit+ δ1lnGROWTHt+ δ2lnINFLt+μit+ϑit , (ii) 
where subscripts i and t, denoted bank i at year t.   
This study therefore estimated a static version of an H-statistic for the specified equation i, 
using a panel fixed-effects4 approach or least squares dummy variables (LSDV) method. In 
essence, the fixed-effects approach controlled for heterogeneity at bank-specific level (Fosu, 
2013). Further, according to the literature, a fixed-effects model allowed the intercept in the 
equation to vary cross-sectionally, but not over time (Brooks, 2013: 490), where α = αi 
(Claessens & Laeven, 2003). Appendix C provides details of the diagnostic tests (Hausman 
test and Wald test) for the chosen model. An H-statistic, therefore, equated to the sum of the 
coefficients of the unit factor prices of funds, labour and capital expenditure (Molyneux et 
al., 1994; Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2003). This was denoted as follows: 
H = β1 +  β2  + β3   (iii)  
where β1 was the coefficient of price of funds, β2 was the coefficient of price of labour and β3 
was the coefficient of capital expenditure. 
3.4.2 Specifying the Panzar-Rosse equation for H2 
Since the literature specified that conditions observed in general market equilibrium validated 
the Panzar-Rosse model (Panzar & Rosse, 1987, Molyneux et al., 1994; Bikker & Haaf, 
2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2003), some minor re-specification of the model to represent the 
natural log of the dependent variable ROA altered the equation as follows: 
lnROAit= α+ β1lnPFit+ β2lnPLit+ β3lnPKit+ γ1lnRISKASSit+γ2lnASSETit+ γ3lnCREDITit+  
γ4lnEQUITYit+ δ1lnGROWTHt+ δ2lnINFLt+ φD2+ φD3 +⋯+φD6+ϑit , (iv) 
Alternatively, 
lnROAit= α+ β1lnPFit+ β2lnPLit+ β3lnPKit+ γ1lnRISKASSit+γ2lnASSETit+ γ3lnCREDITit+  
γ4lnEQUITYit+ δ1lnGROWTHt+ δ2lnINFLt+μit+ϑit , (v) 
where the dependent variable was specified as ROAˊ = ln(1+ROA), in order to adjust for negative 
values of net income (Claessens & Laeven, 2003).  
3.4.3 Defining parameters of an E-statistic 
This study computed an E-statistic to test for equilibrium using a Wald test F-statistic. In this 
case, the assumption was that the sum of the coefficients of the factor prices of funds, labour 
and capital expenditure were statistically equivalent to zero. As such, the null was formulated 
4 This study applied the Hausman test to choose a specification between random- and fixed effects. The null 
hypothesis of random-effect was rejected at the five percent level of significance. A further specification test 
using the Wald test rejected null that pooled OLS is appropriate, and did not reject the fixed-effect or least 
squared dummy variables (LSDV) specification. 
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as E = zero; and it followed that if not rejected, the market was sufficiently in a state of long-
run equilibrium. Notation of an E-statistic followed:  β1 +  β2  + β3 = 0  (vi) 
4.1 Findings 
This section presents a review of descriptive statistics and an analysis of the correlation 
matrix. A detailed presentation on findings from hypotheses testing then follows.  
4.2 Review of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents a summary of descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent 
variables for the period 2008-2013. Importantly, the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
was captured during this period, and a number of interesting findings emerged. First, in all 
periods observed, 2009 appeared to have been a relatively more challenging year as the 
effects of the crisis were still evolving. 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
In 2009, REV increased to its highest level of 14.53 percent from 11.82 percent in 2008, 
intuitively suggesting that banks’ pricing behaviour altered to reflect increasing risk to 
lending activity in light of the financial crisis. Countries that experienced trade vulnerabilities 
(Berman & Martin, 2012), mainly due to declining commodity prices (Allen et al., 2011), 
would have likely reacted to a deterioration in loan quality by raising interest rates. As 
expected, bank performance was negatively affected by changes in the operating environment 
(IMF, 2011), resulting in a mean ROA of 1.41 percent for 2009, which was the lowest over 
the observed period, as some banks reported losses.  
4.2.2 Independent variables 
Not surprisingly, PF increased to its maximum of 10.74 percent in 2009, reflecting rising cost 
of funds associated with the general loss of depositor confidence, capital flight, low liquidity 
and increased leverage (Arieff, 2010; Allen et al., 2011). Years later, however, PF declined 
as regulators tightened prudential policy and directed banks to increase capitalisation levels. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, banks sought to improve the quality of risk management 
and general operations, which resulted in an increase in the wage rate as skilled talent was 
acquired. For instance, the median wage rate in 2009 was the highest ever for the observed 
period, highlighting the short-term pressures faced by banks. Nevertheless, as alternative 
methods of distribution such as branchless banking (Klein & Mayer, 2011) evolved over the 
past few years, pressure on the wage rate diminished. Banks, instead, focused on upgrading 
information technology infrastructure, driving PK to its highest levels in 2010.  
4.2.3 Bank-specific control variables 
Despite the negative effect of the financial crisis on asset quality in many banking systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, a bank-specific control, RISKASS, did not rise significantly. The average 
was 3.41 percent in 2008, but declined to 1.89 percent in 2011. Intuitively, this implied that 
some banking systems where insulated from the impact of the crisis, or had sufficiently 
strong risk management infrastructure to avert a banking crisis. Further, other banking 
systems resorted to either writing off or selling non-performing loans. For example, 
regulatory intervention in Nigeria led to the establishment of AMCON in 2010, and a 
subsequent disposal of over NGN1.5 trillion of non-performing loans by the banking sector 
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(AMCON, 2012). As expected, the bulk of non-performing loans purchased where related to 
the oil and gas sector (27%), trade finance (19%) and capital markets (18%). Nevertheless, 
the sell-off resulted in most banks reducing their NPL ratios to below the regulatory 
stipulated five percent (Sanusi, 2012), which was a key driver in mitigating against a rise in 
RISKASS and improving liquidity. 
Interestingly, lending activity as measured by CREDIT remained relatively stable, with a 
mean of 50.60 percent over the observed period. The extent of financial intermediation in 
banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa pre- and post-crisis was constrained due to a number 
of reasons, such as poor credit information, a lack of collateral and financial illiteracy, such 
that banks traditionally preferred to lend to larger and less-risky corporate customers or 
alternatively held cash and government securities. Therefore, and as expected, there was no 
significant level of deleveraging that occurred post-crisis.  
However, in view of the crisis regulators took precaution by instigating a recapitalisation of 
banking systems across the sub-continent (Čihák et al., 2012). In essence, average EQUITY 
increased to 15.01 percent in 2010, and again increased to 15.11 percent in 2013, as 
profitability of banks improved. For un-scaled balance sheets, the standard deviation of 
ASSET was substantially high, owing to the enormous scale of South African banks relative 
to other banks in the representative sample. However, average ASSET reflected a steady 
increase over the observed period, from USD 4.50 trillion to USD 6.32 trillion. 
4.2.4 Country-specific control variables 
GROWTH also followed a positive trend, from 4.24 percent in 2009 to 6.40 percent in 2011, 
due to a recovery in commodity prices, additional resource discoveries and exploitation, as 
well as rising domestic demand (IMF, 2012). However, growth rates tapered off in 2012 and 
2013 as uncertainties over stability in the global economy increased, and risks of faltering 
demand from emerging economies such as China materialised (IMF, 2014). Average 
inflation, however, did not indicate any trend, owing to differences in pass-through to 
domestic prices from associated local currency depreciation. In 2008, as commodity prices 
peaked (IMF, 2009; Allen et al., 2011), average inflation for the representative sample 
reached a high of 14.61 percent, but subsequently declined to 6.59 percent in 2010. 
 
Table 3: Summary descriptive statistics (percentage, unless otherwise stated) 
Variables Measure 2008 2009 2010 
2011 2012 2013 All 
REV Mean 9.829 10.323 8.866 8.696 9.836 9.593 9.524 
 Median 10.525 10.182 8.775 8.740 10.362 9.977 10.079 
 STD 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.031 0.028 0.026 
 Min 6.439 5.413 4.352 4.573 4.356 4.703 4.352 
 Max 11.824 14.532 12.789 12.266 13.616 13.106 14.532 
ROA Mean 2.041 1.408 2.216 1.712 2.176 2.187 1.957 
 Median 1.791 1.198 2.403 1.724 2.053 1.973 1.882 
 STD 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 Min 0.665 -0.642 1.043 -0.663 1.216 1.258 -0.663 
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 Max 4.016 3.435 3.032 3.517 3.303 3.711 4.016 
PF Mean 5.930 6.210 4.826 4.359 5.387 5.139 5.309 
 Median 5.535 5.879 4.475 4.224 5.278 5.331 5.305 
 STD 0.014 0.023 0.017 0.010 0.018 0.016 0.016 
 Min 4.237 3.538 2.632 2.761 2.572 2.630 2.572 
 Max 7.763 10.735 8.338 5.776 8.045 7.559 10.735 
PL Mean 2.692 2.859 2.571 2.485 2.475 2.395 2.579 
 Median 2.900 3.107 2.763 2.651 2.596 2.521 2.707 
 STD 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 Min 1.121 1.041 0.989 1.002 0.886 0.934 0.886 
 Max 3.415 3.821 3.247 3.373 3.416 3.407 3.821 
PK Mean 142.024 152.060 216.405 187.613 183.472 178.887 176.743 
 Median 133.189 134.596 151.517 145.338 169.733 157.370 148.428 
 STD 0.517 0.553 1.317 1.065 0.776 0.604 0.805 
 Min 78.562 90.574 93.407 88.962 103.179 118.372 78.562 
 Max 240.921 264.995 452.526 408.562 341.490 285.799 452.526 
RISKASS Mean 3.406 3.201 2.385 1.880 1.965 2.063 2.484 
 Median 2.112 2.219 2.052 1.780 1.792 1.734 1.922 
 STD 0.031 0.027 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.015 
 Min 1.424 1.265 0.780 1.120 1.427 1.453 0.780 
 Max 10.145 9.065 5.181 3.040 3.360 3.918 10.145 
ASSET  Mean  4 674  4 502  4 666  5 214  5 744  6 319  5 186  
 Median  998  1 011  1 088  1 140  1 312  1 488  1 114  
 STD 7 585  7 207  7 382  8 008  8 552  9 126  7 977 
 Min 163  205  253  302  347  526  163  
 Max 21 325  20 312  20 854  22 619  24 196  25 888  25 888  
 Total 321 419  313 092  328 038  370 604  410 640  452 011  365 967  
CREDIT Mean 48.685 50.448 50.068 51.487 51.320 51.586 50.599 
 Median 49.692 49.860 49.744 54.044 51.510 49.722 49.802 
 STD 0.073 0.052 0.061 0.083 0.072 0.064 0.068 
 Min 33.877 42.734 43.062 38.362 38.573 41.468 33.877 
 Max 57.127 58.138 61.118 62.014 61.890 60.947 62.014 
Source: Computed by the Authors. 
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Summary descriptive statistics (continued) 
Variables Measure 2008 2009 2010 
2011 2012 2013 All 
EQUITY Mean 14.911 14.445 15.013 14.269 14.675 15.112 14.737 
 Median 15.228 15.354 14.933 14.340 14.997 15.119 15.058 
 STD 0.034 0.035 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.027 0.025 
 Min 9.805 8.895 11.805 11.458 11.605 11.112 8.895 
 Max 18.878 18.126 18.010 17.155 17.530 19.606 19.606 
GROWTH Mean 5.678 4.241 5.794 6.397 4.454 4.683 5.208 
 Median 5.891 3.499 5.832 4.654 3.845 5.041 4.847 
 STD 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.040 0.021 0.017 0.024 
 Min 1.527 1.526 3.140 3.599 2.467 1.891 1.526 
 Max 8.709 7.251 8.007 15.007 8.790 7.132 15.007 
INFL  Mean 14.610 10.453 6.587 10.682 9.006 6.753 9.682 
 Median 11.814 10.386 4.119 9.784 9.270 5.712 9.527 
 STD 0.056 0.052 0.041 0.046 0.035 0.026 0.043 
 Min 9.733 2.550 2.893 5.280 3.852 3.543 2.550 
 Max 26.240 19.251 13.720 18.693 14.016 11.608 26.240 
Source: Computed by the Authors. 
4.3 Analysis of Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 4 mainly indicates positive signs for the 
coefficients. There was a statistically significant positive association between REV and the 
main independent variables PF and PL, with correlation coefficients of 0.62 and 0.64 
respectively. PK, on the other hand, had a negative sign, but the relationship with REV was 
statistically weak as the coefficient was only 0.10. RISKASS and CREDIT had similar 
correlation coefficients with REV, of approximately 0.40 respectively, indicating a positive 
relationship between lending activity and risk management in the determination of interest 
rates. This can also be explained by the notion that the higher the risk associated with 
granting each loan, the higher the lending rate (Brooks, 2013: 498).  
Likewise, the association of RISKASS and CREDIT to PF was also relatively strong, 
indicating that cost of funds played a role in determining the quantity of risk and extent of 
lending activity assumed by each individual bank. Further, the correlation coefficient 
between RISKASS and CREDIT was positive with a correlation coefficient of 0.60. Notably, 
the correlation coefficient between PL and RISKASS of 0.41 indicated that bank wage rates 
were partly influenced by the acquisition of specialised talent in risk management in the wake 
of the financial crisis. PL and INFL had a coefficient of 0.39, but the positive sign highlighted 
the effect of inflationary pressures on the wage rate.  
Lastly, the relationship between ASSET and GROWTH had a correlation coefficient of 0.49 
and, significantly, the positive sign was associated with the notion of a causal link between 
financial sector development and economic growth (King & Levine, 1993; Claessens & 
Laeven, 2003).   
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Table 4: Correlation matrix for the variables for all 481 observations 
 REV PF PL PK RISKASS ASSET 
CREDIT EQUITY GROWTH INFL 
REV  0.624 0.638 -0.095 0.394 0.134 0.406 0.237 0.248 0.443 
PF 0.624  0.164 -0.228 0.471 0.195 0.597 -0.109 0.162 0.278 
PL 0.638 0.164  0.056 0.405 0.115 0.185 0.248 0.180 0.389 
PK -0.095 -0.228 0.056  -0.308 -0.166 -0.325 -0.003 -0.158 -0.050 
RISKAS
S 0.394 0.471 0.405 -0.308  0.288 0.600 -0.075 0.170 0.197 
ASSET 0.134 0.195 0.115 -0.166 0.288  0.021 -0.114 0.490 0.300 
CREDIT 0.406 0.597 0.185 -0.325 0.600 0.021  -0.220 -0.033 0.077 
EQUITY 0.237 -0.109 0.248 -0.003 -0.075 -0.114 -0.220  0.105 0.158 
GROWT
H 0.248 0.162 0.180 -0.158 0.170 0.490 -0.033 0.105  0.118 
INFL 0.443 0.278 0.389 -0.050 0.197 0.300 0.077 0.158 0.118  
Note: Variables taken in natural log.  
Source: Authors Compilation. 
4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section provides detailed findings of the empirical tests of the H1 and H2. In the first 
instance, the outcome of testing for H2 indicated sufficient conditions of market equilibrium. 
Thereafter, H1 was regressed and the conditions of monopolistic competition identified were 
consistent with previous studies. 
4.4.1 General market equilibrium analysis 
H2 was tested for a sample of 83 banks in Sub-Saharan Africa, that banking competition 
exists under conditions of general or long run market equilibrium. Following literature, this 
could also be stated as ROA is not influenced by factor input prices in the long run 
(Molyneux et al., 1996), such that a computed E-statistic = zero. The empirical test, presented 
in detail in Appendix D and summarised in Table 5 below, was conducted using a Wald test. 
The outcome was that the computed value of the E-statistic was 0.003, with a p-value of 
0.407. Therefore, the null hypothesis that unit factor input prices were equivalent to zero, was 
not rejected. The implication, therefore, was that banking competition was observed in a state 
of general equilibrium.  
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Table 5: Test of banking market equilibrium with LSDV model 
Independent variables Dependent variable: lnROA Probability 
lnPF -0.001 0.470 
lnPL -0.005* 0.059 
lnPK 0.003* 0.069 
lnRISKASS -0.001 0.324 
lnASSET 0.005*** 0.000 
lnCREDIT 0.003 0.130 
lnEQUITY 0.013*** 0.000 
lnGROWTH 0.008** 0.018 
lnINFL 0.004 0.164 
D2 -0.053*** 0.000 
D3 -0.065*** 0.000 
D4 -0.007* 0.063 
D5 -0.017*** 0.004 
D6 -0.020*** 0.000 
Intercept 0.031** 0.048 
Number of observations / period 481 2008-2013 
R2 (adjusted) - % 22.3  
H0: E=0 0.003 0.407 
Decision Do not reject null hypothesis; Evidence of long-run equilibrium 
exists 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  
Source: Authors Compilation. 
 
The results of the empirical test for H2 were consistent with findings from previous studies, 
where, in the long run, factor input prices were not having any influence on bank returns. 
These findings were also consistent with the theoretical literature, which states that, in 
equilibrium, the zero profit constraint holds constant at market level (Shaffer, 1982; 
Molyneux et al., 1996; Bikker & Haaf, 2002).   
4.4.2 Test of competition using the Panzar-Rosse approach 
Having satisfied conditions of general market equilibrium, H1 was tested for the same sample 
of 83 banks in sub-Saharan Africa, that there is statistically significant relationship between 
changes in market conditions/power and the extent of competitive conduct. Specifically, a 
regression of the Panzar-Rosse model, using a fixed-effects method, was used to compute a 
continuous measure of an H-statistic that had a value of 0.57 (see Table 6 below). The results 
were validated by a Wald test, which confirmed that the H-statistic was significantly different 
from both unity and zero at the one percent level of significance. The findings therefore 
suggested that the banking system is characterised by monopolistic competition, as opposed 
to perfect competition or pure monopoly.  
Also, the use of a fixed-effects method was validated by conducting a Hausman test (random-
effects versus fixed-effects) and also a Wald test that dummy variables were jointly zero. 
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Both null hypotheses that the random-effects model was appropriate and dummy variables 
were equal to zero, were strongly rejected, allowing for heterogeneity among the banks 
(Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2003; Brooks, 2013: 496; Fosu, 2013).     
Table 6: Test of banking competition with LSDV model 
Independent variables Dependent variable: lnREV Probability 
lnPF 0.289*** 0.000 
lnPL 0.295*** 0.000 
lnPK -0.014 0.392 
lnRISKASS -0.020 0.120 
lnASSET 0.008 0.299 
lnCREDIT 0.020 0.295 
lnEQUITY 0.118*** 0.000 
lnGROWTH 0.019 0.555 
lnINFL 0.034 0.190 
D2 -0.133* 0.092 
D3 -0.299*** 0.000 
D4 -0.111*** 0.008 
D5 -0.354*** 0.000 
D6 -0.183*** 0.002 
Intercept 0.028 0.866 
Number of observations / period 481 2008 - 2013 
R2 (adjusted) - % 22.3 75.1 
H-statistic 0.570  
H0: H=0 (pure monopoly) -0.430 0.000 
H0: H=1 (perfect competition) 0.570 0.000 
Decision Reject both null hypotheses; evidence of monopolistic competition 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively.  
Source: Authors Compilation. 
 
Similarly, the results of monopolistic competition were consistent with outcomes of previous 
studies, and consistent with theoretical literature, since changes in factor input prices (market 
power) incurred by a specific bank influenced changes to its revenue. Under conditions of 
perfect competition, on the one hand, an increase in input prices would have raised marginal 
costs and total revenue by the same amount, where an H-statistic is equal to unity. Under pure 
monopoly, on the other hand, marginal costs would have increased but equilibrium output 
would have declined, such that H-statistic is less than zero (Claessens & Laeven, 2003).  
4.4.3 Interpretation and discussion 
Consistent with the outcome of monopolistic competition, Fosu (2013) suggested that 
reform/liberalisation and prudential policies would have likely influenced pricing behaviour 
of individual banks and market discipline. The findings, therefore, supported H1, that there is 
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a statistically significant positive association between the effect of market conditions 
(banking reform) and the extent of competitive behaviour.  
The results of the LSDV model had a mixed outcome regarding the statistical significance of 
independent variables in explaining differences in REV or pricing behaviour of banks (Bikker 
& Haaf, 2002). Specifically, main independent variables PF and PL strongly influenced REV 
at the one percent level of significance. Their coefficients carried positive signs, which 
intuitively suggested the impact of liberalisation of interest rates (Fosu, 2013) on financial 
intermediation, and the significance of talent acquisition for bank operations (Biekpe, 2011), 
such as risk management and loan pricing. PK, on the other hand, carried a negative sign, but 
not statistical significance.  
Unexpected, bank-specific control variables largely carried no statistical significance 
(RISKASS, ASSET and CREDIT), while RISKASS had a negative sign. EQUITY, however, 
had a strong statistical significance, with a positive sign on the coefficient, implying that 
higher capital levels led to strong pricing power. This was expected in view of the impact of 
prudential policies which followed the onset of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, where a 
significant number of banks in Sub-Saharan Africa increased capital via M&A activity, IPOs 
and/or capitalisation of reserves. Further, the coefficients of macroeconomic control variables 
(GROWTH and INFL) carried positive signs but were not statistically significant. Notably, 
the dummy variables were all statistically significant, vindicating the application of a LSDV 
approach (Brooks, 2013: 497). 
5. Policy Implications 
The findings of this research assignment had significant implications for policy design in 
financial sector development strategy. This was mainly due to the linkage between the extent 
of competition, technological advancement, efficiency of financial intermediation, access to 
financial services, performance and stability (Sanya & Gaertner, 2012; Fosu, 2013). 
First, from the findings it was evident that reform/liberalisation and prudential policies had a 
bearing on the revenue and cost functions of banking systems (Bikker & Haaf, 2002, Fosu, 
2013). As such, market players would likely continue to alter their conduct to ensure profit 
maximisation. For example, interest rate liberalisation could drive higher cost of funds as 
banks sought to compete for market share of deposits. In turn, banks could increase lending 
rates by a higher proportion to expand net interest margin. Second, policy-driven 
recapitalisation of banks resulted in increased market power in pricing of loan output.    
Third, higher contestability of markets, owing to unrestricted/universal banking approaches 
and deregulation of formal barriers, had the implication of driving excessive risk-taking by 
banks in order to defend or expand market share. For example, excessive risk-taking by banks 
in Nigeria, via the provision of ill-fated margin loans (Sanusi, 2012), had significant 
implications in triggering regulatory responses to the ensuing crisis. Fourth, foreign bank 
entry also had implications for contestability of markets, as well as technological 
advancement, recalibration of risk management frameworks and capital flow (Claessens & 
Van Horen, 2011). In East Africa, for example, where formal regulatory barriers were largely 
withdrawn (Sanya & Gaertner, 2012) as a part of policy design, there were a number of 
implications. These included a rise in foreign bank participation, significant cross-border 
capital flows and strong technological innovation, which ultimately enhanced competitive 
conduct of banks. 
Fifth, policy implications on the provision of credit to the private sector indicated a trend 
towards promoting access to finance, further enhancing competitive conduct and performance 
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among banks. Although findings in relation to lending activity were statistically insignificant, 
banks made significant progress in extending their market to low income households and 
SMEs. Lastly, empirical testing and analysis of descriptive statistics found that policy helped 
to foster the development of banking systems and efficiency of financial intermediation in the 
real economy, which ultimately influenced economic growth.    
6. Recommendations 
In view of the implications highlighted above, policymakers should continue to develop and 
promote policies geared towards the development of financial intermediation and improved 
competitive conduct of banks in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the first instance, liberalisation of 
interest rates should remain a pivotal tool for increased contestability of markets and 
sustainable performance, while attracting new players into the market. Further, policy design 
in modernisation of banking infrastructure via technological advancement in 
branchless/alternative distribution should further ease contestability by alleviating wage rates. 
Likewise, prioritising the development and modernisation of credit information bureaux and 
legal systems should further reduce perceived high risk of lending, which currently inhibits 
effective financial intermediation. Also, financial literacy programmes targeted at the 
household and SMEs should foster a financially inclusive approach by banks. This is so, 
because numerous banks operating on the sub-continent remain averse to extending their 
markets beyond a traditional large corporates base. For example, a pilot program for the 
provision of basic accounting techniques through open tutorials in East Africa (Equity Bank, 
2013) has met with success as it has helped to reduce the perception of high risk attached to 
small borrowers. 
Lastly, enhancing contestability of markets by privatising state-run banks and promoting 
regional integration should remain key policy objectives. This would ensure a level playing 
field for existing competitors and present an opportunity for new investors (Sanya & 
Gaertner, 2012). In addition, new investment would expand and develop the credit industry, 
ultimately driving real sector growth. 
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APPENDIX A: 
SUMMARY OF SAMPLE BANKS BY COUNTRY AND YEAR 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2013 
Ghana 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Nigeria 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Kenya 18 21 22 23 23 23 
Uganda 7 8 9 9 9 6 
South Africa 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Mauritius 8 9 10 10 10 10 
 Source: Authors Compilation. 
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APPENDIX B: DIAGNOSTIC TEST FOR H1. 
Wald test 
Null hypothesis: Pooled OLS is appropriate; dummy variables/fixed-effects are equal to zero 
Hausman test 
Null hypothesis: Random-effects model is appropriate 
Alternative: Fixed-effects model is appropriate 
Decision: Reject null hypothesis 
Dependent variable: LNREV 
Test summary Chi-Sq. statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Probability 
Cross-section random 42.669 9 0.000 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed Random Probability 
LNPF 0.345 0.337 0.382 
LNPL 0.264 0.302 0.161 
LNPK 0.015 0.019 0.730 
LNRISKASS 0.012 -0.015 0.000 
LNASSET 0.049 0.000 0.017 
LNCREDIT 0.106 0.031 0.041 
LNEQUITY 0.024 0.069 0.000 
GROWTH 0.0174 0.040 0.006 
INFL 0.041 0.043 0.869 
Cross-section random-effects test equation: 
Method: Fixed-effects; Dependent variable: LNREV 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Probability 
C -0.449 0.207 0.030 
LNPF 0.345 0.021 0.000 
LNPL 0.263 0.039 0.000 
LNPK 0.015 0.021 0.476 
LNRISKASS 0.012 0.015 0.423 
LNASSET 0.049 0.021 0.021 
LNCREDIT 0.106 0.043 0.015 
LNEQUITY 0.024 0.026 0.363 
GROWTH 0.017 0.023 0.445 
INFL 0.041 0.020 0.036 
R2 (adj.) 0.883 Probability (F-stat) 0.000 
S.E of regression 0.151 Mean dependent var. -2.407 
Sum squared residuals 8.820 S.D. dependent var. 0.441 
F-statistic 40.949 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.418 
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APPENDIX C: 
DIAGNOSTIC TEST FOR H2 
Hausman test 
Null hypothesis: Random-effects model is appropriate 
Alternative: Fixed-effects model is appropriate 
Decision: Reject null hypothesis 
Dependent variable: LNROA 
Test summary Chi-Sq. statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Probability 
Cross-section random 25.314 9 0.003 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed Random Probability 
LNPF 0.000 -0.002 0.305 
LNPL -0.005 -0.008 0.518 
LNPK 0.000 0.002 0.308 
LNRISKASS 0.000 -0.001 0.557 
LNASSET 0.011 0.000 0.000 
LNCREDIT -0.003 0.005 0.097 
LNEQUITY 0.011 0.011 0.986 
GROWTH 0.007 0.007 0.737 
INFL 0.005 0.002 0.008 
Cross-section random-effects test equation: 
Method: Fixed-effects; Dependent variable: LNROA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Probability 
C -0.042 0.025 0.091 
LNPF 0.000 0.002 0.903 
LNPL -0.005 0.005 0.265 
LNPK 0.000 0.002 0.984 
LNRISKASS 0.000 0.002 0.818 
LNASSET 0.011 0.003 0.000 
LNCREDIT -0.003 0.005 0.620 
LNEQUITY 0.011 0.003 0.000 
GROWTH 0.007 0.003 0.006 
INFL 0.005 0.002 0.021 
R2 (adj.) 0.441 Probability (F-stat) 0.000 
S.E of regression 0.018 Mean dependent var. 0.019 
Sum squared residuals 0.126 S.D. dependent var. 0.024 
F-statistic 5.154 Durbin-Watson stat. 2.141 
Source: Authors Compilation. 
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Wald test 
Null hypothesis: Pooled OLS is appropriate; dummy variables/fixed-effects are equal to zero 
Alternative: Panel least squares dummy variables model is appropriate 
Decision: Reject null hypothesis 
Dependent variable: LNROA 
Test statistic Value d.f. Probability 
F-statistic 17.701 (5, 466) 0.000 
Chi-square 88.505 5 0.000 
Coefficient Std. Error Probability 
C(1) 0.031 0.016 0.048 
C(2) -0.001 0.002 0.470 
C(3) -0.005 0.002 0.059 
C(4) 0.003 0.002 0.069 
C(5) -0.001 0.001 0.324 
C(6) 0.005 0.001 0.000 
C(7) 0.003 0.002 0.130 
C(8) 0.013 0.002 0.000 
C(9) 0.008 0.003 0.018 
C(10) 0.004 0.003 0.164 
C(11) -0.053 0.008 0.000 
C(12) -0.065 0.007 0.000 
C(13) -0.007 0.004 0.063 
C(14) -0.017 0.006 0.004 
C(15) -0.020 0.006 0.000 
R2 (adj.) 0.223 Probability (F-stat) 0.000 
S.E of regression 0.021 Mean dependent var. 0.019 
Sum squared residuals 0.210 S.D. dependent var. 0.024 
F-statistic 10.816 Durbin-Watson stat. 1.291 
Null hypothesis: C(11)=C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C(15) 
Normalised restriction (=0) Value Std. Error 
C(11) -0.053  0.007560 
C(12) -0.065  0.007308 
C(13) -0.007  0.004026 
C(14) -0.017  0.006076 
C(15) -0.020  0.005632 
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